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Abstract. This article identifies intellectualism as the view that if we simply think 
hard enough about our evidence, we get an adequate answer to the question of 
whether God exists. The article argues against intellectualism, and offers a better 
alternative involving a kind of volitional evidentialism. If God is redemptive in 
virtue of seeking divine -human reconciliation, we should expect the evidence 
for God to be likewise redemptive. In that case, according to the article, the 
evidence for God would aim to draw the human will toward cooperation with 
God’s will. Accordingly, the available evidence for God would be volitionally 
sensitive in that one’s coming to possess it would depend on one’s volitional 
stance toward its source. The article identifies some implications for divine 
hiddenness, traditional natural theology, and the view that the evidence for 
God’s existence is akin to evidence for a scientific hypothesis.
In the noisy courtroom of public opinion, a  theology stands or falls 
with its accompanying epistemology, in particular, with its stand on the 
matter of the evidence for God. If God is truly redemptive in seeking 
divine–human reconciliation, as suggested by large strands in the Jewish 
and Christian traditions, we should expect the evidence for God to be 
correspondingly redemptive. The implications of this lesson for theology 
are significant but widely neglected. This paper draws out some of these 
implications, and explains why a  theology of a  truly redemptive God 
resists any quick and easy dismissal on epistemological grounds and 
instead offers a profound existential challenge for inquirers about God.
I. INTelleCTuAlIsm AND ITs uNDerPINNINGs
If we simply ‘think hard enough’ about our evidence, do we get an 
adequate answer to the question of whether God exists? If we answer yes, 
then we favour an intellectualist approach to the question of whether God 
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exists. such an intellectualist approach includes among its supporters 
atheists as well as theists. If one holds that the adequate answer received 
by thinking hard enough is no, then one is an atheist (for purposes of 
our discussion). In contrast, if one holds that the adequate answer is yes, 
then one is a theist.
We may call a  proponent of an intellectualist approach, whether 
atheist or theist, an intellectual about the question of God’s existence. 
An intellectual, in this sense, can come from any academic discipline 
or from no such discipline. The discipline of academic philosophy, 
however, houses a  large representation of intellectuals regarding God’s 
existence, owing perhaps to its including some influential figures in the 
history of the intellectualist position. We may call their common position 
intellectualism, for lack of a better term. bertrand russell, for instance, 
was an influential proponent of intellectualism; he imagined himself 
protesting as follows upon meeting God: ‘God, you gave us insufficient 
evidence.’ (1970; cf. Dawkins 2006: 74–77) This paper contends that 
intellectualism is suspect at best and arguably false. In doing so, it will 
identify some widely neglected limits of human thinking relative to the 
evidence underlying human faith in God.
A  person’s ‘thinking hard enough’, according to intellectualism, is 
not just a  matter of having a  lot of thoughts, as if the sheer quantity 
of one’s thoughts was the key. The hard thinking in question includes 
one’s using arguments, that is, one’s using premises to infer conclusions, 
either deductively or inductively. This raises the question of the value of 
arguments regarding God’s existence. Is our thinking hard about such 
arguments sufficient for our having an adequate answer to the question 
of whether God exists? The answer is no if humans can, and sometimes 
do, have relevant evidence independent of arguments regarding God’s 
existence. For example, if a human can have a direct experience of God, 
which is neither a thought nor an argument, then there will be room for 
relevant evidence independent of arguments regarding God’s existence. 
We should not exclude such experiential evidence at the start, in order 
to avoid begging some important questions about the evidence for God’s 
existence. (see moser 2008, chap. 2, and 2010, chap. 4, for an attempt to 
make room for such evidence; cf. Farmer 1943, chaps. 3–4.)
When is an answer to the question of whether God exists ‘adequate’? 
An intellectual will offer this reply: when an answer comes from our 
‘thinking hard enough’ about our evidence, it is adequate. even so, 
a convincing reply needs to offer more, given that adequacy in an answer 
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to our question comes from various domains. Objective adequacy 
requires the correctness or the truth of an answer, whereas evidential 
adequacy requires the suitable fit of an answer with one’s overall evidence, 
but does not require the answer’s truth. A person’s overall evidence can 
be incomplete in a way that falls short of yielding truth in beliefs based 
on that evidence. For instance, widely shared astronomical evidence 
before Copernicus and Galileo was incomplete in this manner, at least 
in certain areas of inquiry.
Cognitive adequacy, let us assume, includes both objective adequacy 
and evidential adequacy. Genuine knowledge that a  claim is true has 
this kind of adequacy, regardless of whether one knows that one has 
this knowledge. many philosophers seek cognitive adequacy in their 
answers, because they seek to know that their answers are true. For 
current purposes, we may sidestep the many complications arising from 
Gettier-style problems for the view that justified true belief is sufficient 
for knowledge that a proposition is true (for some relevant details, see 
moser 1989, shope 2002).
If intellectuals seek cognitive adequacy in their answer, they seek not 
only evidential adequacy but also objective adequacy. We have suggested, 
however, that the connection between evidential adequacy and objective 
adequacy is contingent, because the suitable fit of a contingent answer 
with one’s overall evidence does not entail that the answer is true. This 
raises the issue of whether our thinking hard enough about our evidence 
will automatically yield an adequate answer to the question of whether 
God exists, if cognitive adequacy is the goal. The gap between evidential 
adequacy and objective adequacy in various actual cases recommends 
a negative reply to this issue.
It would be implausible to retreat to the view that we (should) care 
only about evidential adequacy, and not objective adequacy. many 
people do care about objective adequacy, because they seek a  correct 
answer to the question of whether God exists. In addition, evidential 
adequacy as characterized above is too limited for the purposes of many 
people. These people seek an answer that fits not only with the evidence 
we have but also with the evidence available to us. The evidence we now 
have can be arbitrarily or prejudicially restricted by us, such as when 
we arbitrarily or prejudicially exclude the pursuit of further relevant 
evidence in a case. our available evidence, in contrast, transcends such 
arbitrary or prejudicial exclusion.
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Consider a  case involving my trusted employee who has always 
exhibited honesty and reliability at his job in the past. An equally trusted 
supervisor, however, has just called my attention to what appear to be this 
employee’s financial irregularities in some recent transactions at work. 
I now have a difficult choice to make, regarding whether to investigate my 
trusted employee by pursuing and gathering further available evidence 
regarding his reliability. my current evidence does not indicate that this 
employee is unreliable; on the contrary, my preponderant evidence, based 
on an extensive work history, indicates that he is reliable. As for available 
evidence I do not (yet) possess, it may undermine the previous evidence 
by indicating that the employee is actually unreliable. If I seek a resilient 
answer to the question of whether my employee is reliable, I will need to 
pursue further available evidence that I do not yet possess. Perhaps most 
employers would undertake this kind of pursuit, but I could refuse to do 
so, owing, for instance, to fear of destroying my longstanding friendship 
with this employee.
We may have difficulty in specifying exactly when evidence is available 
in some cases, but this general point does not count against a distinction 
between the broader evidence available to us and the more limited 
evidence we now have (or, possess). For current purposes, let’s suppose 
that we now ‘have’ evidence only if we have had a salient awareness of it, 
but that we need not have had such an awareness of evidence available to 
us. This distinction will enable us to proceed with some clarity. (For an 
attempt to recruit this distinction to challenge evidence-based atheism, 
see moser 2012a. The current paper identifies the broader significance of 
this distinction for an epistemology involving a redemptive God.)
II. INTelleCTuAlIsT sHorTComINGs
evidence could be available to me but be sensitive, in its being possessed 
by me, to a certain volitional stance or inclination of mine, even if I do 
not actually possess the evidence in question. The volitional stance could 
include my being willing to love or to be faithful in a certain manner, 
perhaps toward the source of the available evidence. In this scenario, 
I could fail to possess the relevant available evidence as a result of my failing 
to love or to be faithful in a certain manner. I thus could be responsible, 
owing to my adopted volitional stance, for my not possessing evidence 
that is available to me. (Here we may use a conception of love, such as 
that of agapē in the New Testament, which requires one’s intentionally 
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caring for what is good for people. For some helpful background for this 
conception, see Furnish 1972; cf. Ferré 1961.)
suppose that you refuse to confide in me regarding your deepest 
motives in life, because (you know that) I do not have the proper love 
for you and hence should not be trusted with evidence regarding your 
deepest motives. We might imagine that I am the town gossip who cares 
only about the attention I bring to myself, even at the expense of others. 
Accordingly, you hide yourself from me in terms of who you really are, 
since I am a real threat to your good purposes, if not to your dignity as 
a person. In fact, it may be harmful to me as well as you to reveal your 
deepest motives to me, because I would handle this information in a bad 
way for all involved.
understandably, you would have no desire to enable, or otherwise to 
promote, my harmful tendencies in handling confidential information. 
As a result, you plausibly would withhold from me evidence regarding 
your deepest motives and hence regarding yourself, that is, evidence 
concerning who you really are. even so, that evidence would be available 
to me, because (we may suppose) you would give it to me upon my 
coming to love you or to be faithful to you. We may call this volitionally 
sensitive available evidence, because my coming to possess this evidence 
would depend on my volitional stance toward the source of the evidence.
God could have good, redemptive purposes in making at least some 
available evidence of God volitionally sensitive in its being possessed 
by us humans. This evidence then would be sensitive to our volitional 
stance toward God and God’s will. God could be evidentially elusive in 
this manner for purposes of redeeming humans via moral-character 
transformation toward God’s character of perfect love (agapē). That is, 
God could hide or withhold evidence of God’s reality for the good of 
potential recipients of this evidence. This divine hiding could save (at 
least some) people from rejecting God outright when they are not ready 
to receive God as the rightful Lord of their lives. In that case, they would 
not be prepared to handle the evidence redemptively, in keeping with 
God’s good purposes toward divine–human reconciliation.
As redemptive, God would care about how people respond to 
evidence of God’s reality, and would offer such evidence accordingly. As 
a result, God would not be a promiscuous exhibitionist or a superficial 
entertainer regarding the divine evidence offered to humans. more 
specifically, God would preserve a redemptive role for available divine 
evidence by encouraging its pursuit with a cooperative, obedient human 
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will. such a human pursuit of divine evidence would contrast with any 
passive reception of evidence by humans. A number of biblical writers 
emphasize the importance of human pursuit of God. For instance, 
Jeremiah assigns the following announcement to God: ‘When you search 
for me, you will find me; if you seek me with all your heart,  I will let 
you find me, says the Lord.’ (Jer. 29:13–14, NrsV; cf. lk. 11:9–13, matt. 
7:7–11) Human pursuit of God and evidence for God can bring needed 
focus to human wills and lives, and prevent humans from becoming 
complacent and presumptuous relative to God. such a pursuit, therefore, 
can contribute to the redemption of humans as reconciliation to God.
God could bob and weave in divine self-manifestation, for the 
sake of challenging people to approach God with due seriousness and 
reverence, and not to treat God as a controllable or dispensable object. 
In particular, some people may wake up to God as a valuable reality after 
feeling God’s absence in their lives but then being confronted by God’s 
self-manifestation, perhaps by the presentation of divine agapē in their 
conscience. We humans sometimes learn deeply from a sharp contrast 
between the absence and the presence of something in our experience. 
A redemptive God would seek to elicit a human decision in favour of 
God’s character of agapē, in particular, a  priority commitment that 
puts God and God’s moral character first in human life. In this respect, 
redemption would be cooperative, as humans resolve to share in God’s 
moral character as a priority in their lives. (on the central role of human 
decision in redemption, see minear 1966, chap. 3; moser 2013, chap. 4.)
The relevant idea of divine self-manifestation in agapē figures in 
the apostle Paul’s understanding of the evidential basis for belief and 
hope in God (see, for instance, rom. 5:5, 10:20). Following Isaiah, Paul 
invokes God’s self-manifestation to unexpecting humans (in particular, 
Gentiles), and he understands it as seeking to ‘pour out’ divine agapē 
within receptive humans. This self-manifestation, being redemptive, 
would seek to have humans put divine agapē first in their lives, above all 
the alternatives, in keeping with the greatest love-command (see ramsey 
1943). Paul seems to hold that God’s self-disclosure is sensitive, at least 
to some extent, to human disclosure to God, whereby one allows oneself 
to be known, and laid hold of, by God (see Gal. 4:9; cf. Phil. 3:12). In 
any case, we should allow that God can disclose God’s will to a person, 
perhaps in conscience, without that person’s knowing that it is God’s will 
thereby disclosed. (on the role of conscience, see Forsyth 1909, chap. 7.)
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We should not infer that a person must earn or merit (evidence of) 
God’s self-manifestation or become morally perfect to be presented with 
it. such an inference would seriously distort the moral character of a God 
who is worthy of worship and hence gracious and merciful. Instead, we 
should consider that a person may need to be willing to cooperate with 
God’s perfect will if that person is to receive a clear self-manifestation 
from God. The problem is not that God would be personally injured 
in a  devastating way by uncooperative humans; it is rather that such 
humans can dishonour (the dignity of) God and themselves. In fostering 
such dishonour, one can bring about a kind of relational harm, that is, 
harm to a potential good relationship between humans and God. one 
thereby could harm the purpose of God’s self-manifestation to humans, 
if only by frustrating it, and thus harm oneself in turn.
suppose that God seeks to redeem all constitutive aspects of human 
persons, including not just human thinking but also the willing, or 
volitional, activity integral to human agency. God then would offer 
a challenge to these aspects of human persons for the sake of their being 
transformed toward God’s character and purposes and thus reconciled 
to God. This involves the question of who God wants a redeemed person 
to be in relation to God. It is plausible to suppose that God would desire 
redeemed human agents who reflect God’s moral character and agency 
in intention and action, and not just redeemed thinkers. The volitional 
activity central to human agency is not just thinking or even thinking 
hard about evidence. It involves decisions regarding the kind of person 
one aims to be, in terms of moral character and practice. As a result, moral 
responsibility looms large in the make-up of a  mature human agent. 
In being redemptive, God would not neglect the volitional make-up 
of human agents, but rather would aim to lead it, non-coercively, into 
cooperation with God’s perfect will.
In the spirit of Job, humans often strive to understand God and 
God’s providential ways to gain security and assurance for themselves. 
We should not expect God’s security or assurance, however, to arise 
from mere human understanding, which is painfully limited in scope, 
especially regarding God’s purposes in particular cases. Instead, we 
should expect divine security and assurance for humans to emerge from 
their volitional activity in response to God. This lesson fits with the 
following simple but profound remark from the prophet micah: ‘What 
is good, and what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to 
love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God.’ (micah 6:8, NrsV)
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In micah’s perspective, God aims for more than hard thinking by 
humans, even hard thinking with correct and well-grounded content. 
God aims, in addition, for volitional activity from humans that includes 
loving and obeying God. Clearly, such volitional activity is not captured 
by ‘thinking hard’ about evidence. I  can think hard about, and even 
accept, evidence for God but not welcome, love, or obey God at all. The 
volitional activity in question can be an avenue to more, and even better, 
evidence regarding God, as a  human conforms to God’s redemptive 
expectations. so, the evidence for God’s reality from divine self-
manifestation could be sensitive to human wills, and thus could allow for 
divine hiding in the face of volitional resistance. In this portrait of God, 
we cannot simply think ourselves into an objectively adequate answer 
regarding God’s reality, because God would want, by way of redemption, 
more than our thinking. God would want to redeem our full agency, 
including our volitional features (such as our love), because God would 
want us to reflect divine moral agency in willing cooperation with God. 
If God would not want the latter, then God would not want what is best 
for us, and this would rob God of worthiness of worship.
one’s being willing to obey God, in keeping with God’s perfect will, 
mirrors the crisis of Jesus in Gethsemane. seeking to obey God and 
thereby to inaugurate God’s kingdom, Jesus found himself called by God 
to give up his own life in self-sacrifice to God for the sake of others. 
This was a  temporary struggle between Jesus and God, where Jesus 
anticipated his arrest and crucifixion by roman officials as part of God’s 
plan of redemption. mark’s Gospel sketches the situation: ‘[Jesus and his 
disciples] went to a place called Gethsemane ... He said to them, “I am 
deeply grieved, even to death ...” [H]e threw himself on the ground and 
prayed that, if it were possible, the hour [of his arrest and crucifixion] 
might pass from him. He said, “Abba, Father, for you all things are 
possible; remove this cup [of suffering and death] from me; yet, not what 
I want, but what you want”.’ (mark 14:32–36, NrsV)
Gethsemane begins with a  humanly experienced conflict between 
a human want and a divine want, but ends with a resolution in a human 
plea to God in favour of God’s will. Accordingly, the Gethsemane 
approach to God puts God’s perfect will first, even when a  serious 
human want must yield to God’s volitional challenge. The challenge from 
God could come in human conscience, where one is convicted by God 
of wandering away from what is good or right, and this challenge could 
be encouraged by other humans. even if some people regard human 
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conscience as just socially informed by humans, God still could work in 
conscience to challenge people to cooperate with God’s will. In that case, 
receptive humans could find the God who hides, not in mere reflection, 
but instead in the experiential and volitional conflict of a Gethsemane-
style crisis, where God offers a new mode of life to humans on God’s 
perfect terms. In following the example of Jesus in Gethsemane, humans 
then would resolutely allow God to be God at least in some area of their 
volitional and practical lives.
We might think of a Gethsemane crisis as providing an opportunity 
for a kind of practical rationality toward God, via one’s willingly moving 
toward cooperation with God. That is, one’s will could move toward 
God’s will by one’s responding in obedience to God’s challenging self-
manifestation in human conscience. If this is practical rationality toward 
God, its practicality consists in the non-coerced exercise of one’s will to 
comply with God’s will. It also would be substantive practical rationality, 
because it would encompass genuine goodness in cooperation with God’s 
perfect will. In other words, it would not be purely instrumental practical 
rationality. God would represent a  standard of goodness independent 
of the variability of human preferences or ends. In addition, God could 
nudge and encourage receptive people toward a Gethsemane crisis, and, 
therefore, they would not have to set up this crisis on their own. God 
would bring Gethsemane to humans as needed, at the opportune times.
In the perspective offered here, intellectualism is an inadequate 
approach to the question of whether God exists. It neglects the plausible 
view that God would have definite redemptive purposes for humans 
and would reveal the evidence for God accordingly. As a  result, God 
could provide available evidence for God’s reality that is volitionally 
sensitive, in its being possessed by a  human, to the direction of one’s 
will relative to cooperation with God’s will. many philosophers overlook 
this view, because they assume, in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, 
that God is (or would be) immutable or static rather than purposively 
elusive. It seems, however, that a  God who is worthy of worship and 
hence morally perfect would have to be purposively elusive for the good 
of potential human recipients of divine evidence. such a  God would 
oppose half-heartedness in humans toward God, and seek instead their 
whole-hearted commitment to God (see, e.g., Deut. 4:29, Jer. 29:13, mk. 
12:29–30; on the idea of God as elusive, see minear 1966, chap. 8, Terrien 
1978, moser 2008).
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We should acknowledge some pre-receptive evidence for God, where 
a  person has initial evidence for God’s self-manifestation (perhaps in 
conscience) but does not cooperate with God at all. such evidence would 
be elusive, unstable, and thin, because God would not want people to rest 
content with it, apart from cooperating with God. Consider a resolute 
enemy of God such as the biblical character called ‘satan’, who believes 
that God exists but does not receive God cooperatively as the Lord of 
his life. satan can reasonably believe (on elusive, pre-receptive evidence) 
that God exists, because God has self-manifested divine reality to satan 
to a  very limited extent. However, in rejecting God’s will, satan has 
freely prevented God from manifesting divine reality to a  redemptive, 
cooperative extent, where God’s powerful love is poured out in his 
heart (cf. rom. 5:5). In the biblical perspective, satan is not volitionally 
receptive to God at all, and therefore his pre-receptive evidence does 
not lead to the kind of salient transformative evidence arising from 
cooperation with God.
III. moTIVes For INTelleCTuAlIsm
Proponents of intellectualism have various motives for their position, 
three of which merit attention here. First, they often seek aid from 
considerations about a  needed method. In particular, they adopt 
a  method for belief formation and belief revision, and then wield it 
across the board. This strategy is not mistaken in principle, but it needs 
to be handled cautiously, in a manner that does not preclude reasonable 
acknowledgment of genuine features of reality. For instance, we should 
be suspicious of any method that precludes reasonable acknowledgment 
of either human agents or mid-sized physical objects, such as tables and 
human bodies. We might say, then, that an adequate method of belief 
formation will call for an adequate meta-method of belief formation: 
that is, an adequate method regarding (the identification of) an adequate 
method of belief formation. Inquirers must avoid, however, an endless 
regress of required methods, if only because we do not possess an infinite 
number of such methods in regress.
A  key question arising from a  meta-method about a  proposed 
method for belief will be: what does this method set as parameters for 
(evidential) acceptability in a set of beliefs? more specifically, does the 
method allow for (potential) reasonable acknowledgment of an elusive 
God who aims to redeem humans non-coercively? or, instead, does it 
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preclude such acknowledgment from the start? In the latter case, we 
may face methodological bias of a sort that can hinder the reasonable 
pursuit of truth. of course, one might try to establish that our barring 
acknowledgment of an elusive God is well-grounded in our available 
evidence. That task, however, sets a  tall order indeed for advocates of 
the position in question, because our available evidence does not seem 
exclusive in the manner required. It seems more open-ended than 
suggested by the position at hand.
If God exists and is available to humans, a method for inquiring about 
God should fit with reasonable, evidence-based acknowledgment of the 
character and purposes of God, and not preclude such acknowledgment. 
Philosophers have sometimes adopted methods that settle the issue of 
God’s existence in advance of due attention to the relevant evidence. For 
instance, a method that requires an evidential basis in mundane sensory 
evidence will represent a highly questionable bias. The same is true of 
a method that requires conformity either to a materialist ontology or to 
the kind of experimental procedures typical of a chemistry laboratory. 
In general, then, we should not let a  questionable method blind us 
from acknowledging genuine aspects of reality and the corresponding 
evidence. Instead, we should allow human experience of reality to play 
a  key role in adjudicating among the many methods in circulation. 
otherwise, we may have the proverbial oddity of putting the cart before 
the horse, or, at least, we may have an implausible bias in our method. 
more to the point, we should not allow a method to preclude volitionally 
sensitive evidence of God from the start.
The second motive for some commitments to intellectualism comes 
from an unduly restrictive demand for evidence of God. As suggested, 
bertrand russell (1970) anticipated his response if God were to meet 
him, perhaps after death: ‘God, you gave us insufficient evidence.’ russell 
might have considered a  bit more modesty in the presence of God, 
perhaps by inquiring about available evidence of God that is volitionally 
sensitive in its being acquired by humans. In that case, russell might 
have asked: ‘God, what purposes of yours led to your being subtle and 
elusive regarding the available evidence of your reality? Is such evidence 
volitionally sensitive in our acquiring it? If so, might this have a redemptive 
purpose?’ It is disappointing that russell gives no indication of being 
aware of such plausible questions for a God who is redemptive toward 
humans. He should have asked about the moral character and purposes 
of a  God worthy of worship, in order to avoid begging key questions 
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about the evidence for God. In that case, however, russell would have 
had a big challenge on his hands, or at least on his will, because he, rather 
than God, would be subject to challenge on volitional grounds.
The lesson is that intellectualism, advocating mere intellectual 
reflection to settle the question of God’s existence, is existentially too 
thin for the kind of evidence suitable to a redemptive God. Humans in 
need of redemption should not expect to know a redemptive God on the 
cheap, as if no volitional challenge is needed. Just as there is no place for 
cheap grace in a robust theology, so also there is no place for redemptively 
cheap evidence of a gracious God who seeks the redemption of humans. 
many proponents of the arguments of natural theology run afoul of this 
lesson. These theorists assume that if atheists and agnostic just thought 
hard enough on our common evidence, they would come to acknowledge 
the reality of God. These atheists and agnostics, they assume, then would 
see the crucial role in reality for a First Cause, a Designer, or a Perfect 
being, which (at least according to Aquinas, the godfather of modern 
natural theology) we all know to be God. The needed evidence for God, 
according to this position, is in our midst and even in our possession, 
but we need to think more rigorously to see its bearing on theism. That 
position, however, is too shallow, volitionally and existentially.
A serious problem is that the god of traditional natural theology (and 
its corresponding evidence) is not elusive in the manner to be expected 
of a redemptive God who bobs and weaves, and even hides, to challenge 
humans for their own redemptive good. This kind of redemptive God 
would not be the static solution to merely intellectual questions, but 
instead would seek to move humans, non-coercively, toward God at the 
level of their wills, to put God’s will first in all things. That is, this God 
would aim to redeem humans as agents, and not just as thinkers. like 
intellectualism, traditional natural theology neglects this key lesson, and 
therefore is defective. (For elaboration, see moser 2010, chap. 3; 2012b; 
2013, chap. 3.)
We can put the problem at hand in terms of divine presence as divine 
self-manifestation to humans. If God self-authenticates divine reality for 
humans by the self-manifestation of God’s moral character (including 
agapē), but seeks not to coerce humans to receive this manifestation, 
then God’s self-manifestation is rejectable by humans. That is, the self-
manifestation of God’s moral character to humans does not force the will 
of humans in a way that undermines their genuine agency in responding 
to God. As a result, God’s self-manifestation allows humans to say no to it 
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by excluding it from their focus. In other words, God is willing to withdraw 
divine self-manifestation to leave room for genuine human agency 
regarding divine presence. such basic evidence of God’s reality, then, is 
not static across human experience. It can vary relative to the volitional 
stance of its potential recipients, so as not to trivialize or to obscure the 
redemptive intent of divine intervention in human experience. (A notion 
of divine self-authentication, not to be confused with self-authentication 
of religious experience or of scripture, can be found in mackintosh 1912 
and stewart 1940; see also moser 2013, chaps. 3, 5.)
The third motive is not an avowed reason for intellectualism, but it 
still plays a psychological role in some commitments to intellectualism. 
The unexpressed motive, I propose, is desired avoidance of a volitional 
struggle with a redemptive God. such avoidance has a range of detrimental 
results, including a coupling of intellectualism with a destructive kind 
of intellectual pride. This pride manifests itself in the common attitude 
that opponents of intellectualism, of a theistic or an atheistic variation, 
are intellectually dim in a  peculiar manner. such an attitude emerges 
even from many proponents of natural theology when their favoured 
evidence fails to convince critics. (We need not name names here.) This 
paper offers an alternative to such misplaced pride by shifting attention to 
volitional sensitivity in humans, beyond their intellectual skills. In doing 
so, it acknowledges the significance of the kind of volitional attitude 
candidly expressed by Thomas Nagel: ‘I want atheism to be true  ... I hope 
there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe 
to be like that.’ (1997: 130) Nagel worries that the existence of God would 
pose a serious ‘cosmic authority problem’ for us. The obstacle for Nagel, 
among many others, is clearly volitional, and not (just or even primarily) 
intellectual. even so, Nagel is right: the existence of a perfectly loving, 
redemptive God would raise a cosmic authority problem for us humans, 
because God’s perfect will would challenge our imperfect wills.
IV. CoNCluDING eXPeCTATIoNs
In sum, intellectualism regarding the question of God’s existence is 
a dead end relative to a truly redemptive God. It neglects the important 
consideration that a redemptive God would offer available evidence that 
is volitionally sensitive in its being possessed by humans. Whether atheist 
or theist, proponents of intellectualism have ignored this consideration 
to their own detriment. This lesson does not undermine the value of 
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thinking in human faith in God. Instead, it puts such thinking in 
a proper context, with proper, redemptive bounds. This context allows 
God to seek to engage agents not just with their minds but also with their 
wills, for the sake of a human volitional commitment to the priority of 
God’s will. As a result, inquirers should not uncritically expect God or 
enduring evidence for God’s existence to be accessible just by human 
thinking about the evidence we possess.
God would seek to engage humans redemptively as agents, not just 
thinkers, and we should expect evidence of God to be elusive, variable, 
and challenging to that end. In particular, we should expect salient 
evidence of God to come through a Gethsemane crisis rather than mere 
casual reflection on our evidence. As a  result, we should doubt any 
suggestion, such as that of Dawkins (2006: 52, 59), that evidence for God’s 
existence is to be treated just like evidence for a  scientific hypothesis. 
As an elusive personal agent, God would differ in significant ways from 
typical scientific objects, and this would yield a relevant difference in the 
two kinds of evidence.
Human inquiry about God, in the perspective offered here, is 
inextricably bound up with who a  human intends and resolves to be, 
either in cooperation with God or in opposition to God (the latter 
including indifference toward God). In addition, the salient evidence for 
God comes not from abstract philosophical arguments, but instead from 
God’s self-manifestation to humans at God’s opportune times. This self-
manifestation can come in human conscience, but it cannot come just by 
human resources. We lack the power to manifest God’s moral character 
on our own, and therefore we must be prepared to receive evidence for 
God as a redemptive gift rather than as our earning or creation.
The redemptive gift would include the power of righteous love 
experienced typically in human conscience, and this power (as 
representing the moral character of God) is to be received and obeyed. 
Given its immediacy, humans have no need to argue to it by natural 
theology. This power amounts to divine self-authentication via the 
self-manifestation of God’s moral character to humans. Inquiry about 
God looks very different from this perspective, especially very different 
from the troubled position of intellectualism. It takes on an existential 
value that intellectualism omits. In particular, it suggests that inquirers 
of God may very well be under inquiry themselves, by a  redemptive 
God. each inquirer must settle firsthand whether this is actually so, 
specifically for his or her own will relative to a morally perfect will. In 
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this regard, the vital challenge of Gethsemane bears on all human agents, 
sooner or later. A theology accompanied by such an epistemology will 
be not only resilient in the face of familiar objections to theism but also 
existentially vital for cooperative humans. The outstanding question is, 
finally, whether we humans are sincerely willing to cooperate with God’s 
perfect will.
bIblIoGrAPHY
Dawkins, richard. 2006. The God Delusion (New York: Houghton mifflin)
Farmer, Herbert H. 1943. Towards Belief in God (New York: macmillan)
Ferré, Nels. 1961. ‘The Nature and Power of Christian experience’, in Ferré, 
Searchlights on Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper), pp. 184–95
Forsyth, P.T. 1909. The Person and Place of Jesus Christ (london: Independent 
Press)
Furnish, Victor Paul. 1972. The Love Command in the New Testament (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press)
mackintosh, H.r. 1912. The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ (New York: 
Charles scribner’s sons)
minear, Paul s. 1966. Eyes of Faith, 2nd ed. (st. louis: Abbott books)
moser, Paul K. 1989. Knowledge and Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press)
moser, Paul K. 2008. The Elusive God (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press)
moser, Paul K. 2010. The Evidence for God (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press)
moser, Paul K. 2012a. ‘undermining the Case for evidential Atheism’, Religious 
Studies, 48 (1): 83–93
moser, Paul K. 2012b. ‘Natural Theology and the evidence for God’, Philosophia 
Christi, 14 (2): 305–11
moser, Paul K. 2013. The Severity of God (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press)
Nagel, Thomas. 1997. The Last Word (New York: oxford university Press)
ramsey, Paul. 1943. ‘The Great Commandment’, Christianity and Society, 
8: 29–35
russell, bertrand. 1970. ‘The Talk of the Town’, The New Yorker (February 21, 
1970), p. 29. Cited in Al seckel, ed., Bertrand Russell on God and Religion 
(buffalo: Prometheus, 1986), p. 11
shope, robert K. 2002. ‘Conditions and Analyses of Knowing’, in Paul moser, 
ed., The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (New York: oxford university 
Press), pp. 25–70
stewart, James s. 1940. ‘Who is this Jesus?’, in stewart, The Strong Name 
(edinburgh: T&T Clark), pp. 80-89
Terrien, samuel. 1978. The Elusive Presence (New York: Harper & row)
